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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The 10
th
 Parallel marine and aerial routes linking South 
America and West Africa harbor a long history of trade 
between the two continents.  More recently, these routes 
have become one of the preferred routes used by Latin 
American traffickers for shipping multi-tons of cocaine 
destined for the growing European market. The Parallel‘s 
growing importance in cocaine trafficking has made it 
known as cocaine ―Highway 10‖ among law enforcement. 
 
Latin American cocaine trafficking organizations, 
particularly the Colombian ones, have established stable 
bases in West Africa, controlling and developing the route. 
West African facilitators, Nigerians as well as an increasing 
number of nationals from all countries where shipments are 
stocked, have developed a stronger capacity for taking over a 
more ambitious and lucrative role in the business as 
transporters, partners, and final buyers. In one case (Guinea), 
the West African partner had already started developing his 
own trafficking and manufacturing capacity, reproducing the 
patterns that made Colombia the business model of the drug 
industry. In this reshaped context, of particular concern is the 
role played by the Colombian FARC (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia) as provider of cocaine 
shipments to West African cocaine entrepreneurs, as well as 
the impact of drug trafficking money on the financing of 
terrorist and rebel groups operating in the Sahel-Saharan belt.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In February 2005 the United Nations (UN) Secretary General 
in his Report on West Africa presented by his Special 
Representative, Amb. Mohammed Ould Abdullhahi 
informed the Security Council (SC) and the international 
community of a new threat to peace, stability, and 
development in West Africa:   
 
The sub-region continues to be confronted by 
the phenomenon of violent military 
adventurism to seize power. Within the last 12 
months, for instance, several West African 
countries have had coup attempts: Burkina 
Faso, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and 
Mauritania. Moreover, it has emerged that 
some members of the security and armed 
forces are associated with or otherwise 
involved in such illicit activities as smuggling 
of arms, drugs and natural resources, human 
trafficking, extortion at roadblocks and 
money-laundering.
1
 
  
From that moment on, analysis of the potential impact of the 
money and culture of drug trafficking and transnational 
organized crime became necessary complements to the work 
of international and regional security bodies and think-tanks 
involved with West Africa. Attention to the spill-over effects 
of drug trafficking in Guinea Bissau
2
 was then directed to 
Guinea, Sierra Leone, and the Sahel-Saharan corridor, 
                                                 
1
  ArmsNetAfrica, ―Progress report of the Secretary-General on ways to 
combat sub-regional and cross-border problems in West Africa,‖ 
S/2005/86, 11 February 2005, par. 34, page 9.   
2
 On 24 October 2007 the UNSC issued a Presidential Statement 
expressing deep concern about the threat posed by drug trafficking in 
Guinea-Bissau, S/PRST/2007/38. For a complete review of UNSC action 
on drug trafficking in West Africa see ―Security Council Report Update‖, 
N.1, 4 December 2009, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org.  
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leading to a shift in the way the international community 
regarded and approached security issues (and intervention) in 
this part of the world. The West African case also opened the 
way to many similar scenarios elsewhere in Africa and 
globally, where the interests of illicit traffickers and 
organized crime constitute a considerable obstacle to the 
resolution of long-lasting political crises. Thus, the special 
session of the Security Council on February 2010, devoted to 
the destabilizing impact of transnational organized crime on 
fragile states, was the end of an induction phase and the 
beginning of a new operational approach to security and 
governance-related problems in fragile states and post 
conflict countries. 
 
This important progress has not, however, impeded West 
African countries in danger of falling into the spiral of 
violence (generated by drug trafficking and organized 
crime) from experiencing the troubles foreseen in 2005 by 
the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for 
West Africa.  Despite close scrutiny by the international 
community (including the UN, the European Union (EU), 
and the regional Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), the worst scenarios materialized in the 
region. Coups d’état occurred in Guinea Bissau, Guinea, 
Mauritania, and Niger, together with the murder of 
prominent political figures, mass violence, kidnapping of 
foreigners, terrorist attacks in the Sahel-Saharan corridors, 
and drug trafficking—particularly cocaine trafficking. 
 
This paper thus looks at the emerging actors and features of 
drug (cocaine) trafficking in West Africa. In particular, it 
focuses on the consolidation of the West African cocaine 
route in terms of both operators and modus operandi. It 
then examines the strengthening of tactical relationships 
between criminal operators, insurgents, and terrorist groups 
along the West African cocaine route. Lastly, it compares 
the current West African situation with similar situations 
experienced by other drug transit countries and societies.      
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HIGHWAY 10 
 
Just 2575 kilometers separates Dakar and West Africa from 
the Brazilian town of Fortaleza along the 10
th
 Parallel. The 
maritime routes through the 10th Parallel were used during 
the 15
th
 through19th centuries for moving millions of 
enslaved Africans from the Gulf of Guinea to the Americas. 
During the Second World War the US Army established an 
aerial bridge along the 10
th
 Parallel for flying troops and 
equipment to the Mediterranean and North African war 
fronts via Dakar and Casablanca. After the war, the aerial 
bridge along the 10
th
 parallel remained the shortest and most 
effective route from South America to Europe. 
  
 
5 
 
Today the maritime and (increasingly) aerial routes along the 
10
th
 Parallel have become one of the preferred routes used by 
Latin American traffickers for shipping multi-tons of cocaine 
destined for the growing European market. The parallel‘s 
growing importance in cocaine trafficking has made it 
known as cocaine ―Highway 10‖ among law enforcement.3 
 
Trans-Atlantic trafficking of narcotics emerged at the 
beginning of the 1990‘s when Nigerian criminal networks4 
started using West Africa as transit and redistribution point 
for Asian heroin destined for North American and 
European markets. Using the Nigerian diaspora all over the 
world and capitalizing on well-developed trade skills, 
Nigerian networks, particularly from the southeast and 
southwest of the country, specialized in arranging quick 
delivery of relatively small quantities (from 0.5 to 25 kilos) 
of narcotics in any market of the world on behalf of larger 
drug trafficking criminal networks. Well before Colombian 
networks, and thanks to a series of local ―competitive 
advantages,‖5 Nigerian networks involved in drug 
trafficking reinvented and refined the human mules method 
to reduce the risk of interception by law enforcement.
6
  The 
skills and capacity of Nigerian criminal networks 
                                                 
3
 Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook, ―Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: 
Trends and U.S. Policy,‖ 30 September 2009, CSR Reports, page 12; 
Christophe Champin, Afrique Noire poudre blanche l’Afrique sous la 
coupe des cartels de la drogue, (Brussels, Belgium: Andre Versailles Ed, 
2010), page 78; Mathew Green ―West Africa: Unbroken Line,‖ 4 
November 2008, The Financial Times. 
http://www.matthewgreenjournalism.com/articles/. 
4
 Antonio L. Mazzitelli, ―Transnational organized crime in West Africa,‖ 
International Affairs, (Chatham House), Vol. 83 N.6, November 2007, 
page 1084. 
5
 Among them the large availability of (disposable) human resources, the 
relative facility in avoiding controls on arrival and departure at Lagos 
airport, the role of Lagos Airport as a major African air transport hub, 
and the large Nigerian diaspora.  
6
 UNODC, ―Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa Situation Report,‖ 
October 2007, page 11, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Cocaine-trafficking-Africa-en.pdf. 
6 
 
(disorganized as well as organized) coupled with their 
unique globalized business orientation not only earned 
them the nickname of the ―express delivery‖ operators of 
the drug industry, but also allowed them to develop 
business relations with different partners all over the main 
drug producing areas.
7
 
 
By the mid-1990s, in addition to heroin and home-grown 
cannabis, Nigerian networks started trading in cocaine. As 
usual, initial trafficking routes used by West African 
(mostly Nigerian) networks capitalized on cultural and 
language commonalities (a result of a shared colonial 
history) to ease the travel of couriers as well as reduce risk 
of  interception by law enforcement and the likelihood of 
seizure and arrest. In the absence of direct flights, cocaine 
routes controlled by West African networks moved first to 
the Caribbean, where cocaine couriers then boarded flights 
to North European air hubs (London and Amsterdam) via 
West Africa. These shipments were re-routed from West 
Africa to final destinations in Europe, taking advantage of 
the reduced attention on passengers on flights originating 
from West Africa by European law enforcement airport 
check-points. During this period, West African trafficking 
operators also started establishing direct contacts with 
cocaine providers in South America. These contacts and the 
overall ―credibility‖ of West African traffickers were 
essential later on when the growing market for cocaine 
from Europe would call for the opening up of a West 
African cocaine route.  
 
By the end of the 1990s, Colombian trafficking 
organizations branched out from US wholesale markets and 
started focusing on developing alternative markets, 
particularly in Europe. This was based on the establishment 
of safe trafficking routes for supplying new markets. Spain 
was the natural gate for opening up European markets to 
Colombian cocaine entrepreneurs. The worldwide Galician 
                                                 
7
 C. Champin, opp. Cit, page 83.   
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fishing industry offered Colombian networks ideal partners 
for moving multi-ton cocaine shipments through the 
Atlantic. Initially, cocaine shipments traveled directly from 
Latin America to Spain on fishing trawlers or private 
yachts sailing from the Caribbean. The increased attention 
of law enforcement on these routes induced trafficking 
organizations to look for alternative trafficking methods, 
including staging transshipment consignments in the 
middle of the Atlantic or close by West African shores and 
using commercial containers. In order to run these 
important operations, Latin American networks needed 
local West African partners responsible for providing 
logistical assistance to incoming and outgoing shipments, 
ensuring overall impunity and in some cases granting 
protection from the predatory attitude of corrupted local 
law-enforcement and military agents. Natural partners in 
this new business venture were the very Nigerian operators 
with whom they had established business relations in 
previous years. 
  
Ideal locations for hosting traffickers‘ stockpiling and 
redistribution stations were small, stable countries run by 
weak institutions and often controlled by corruptible elites. 
Additional considerations like geographical proximity to 
Nigeria,
8
 the cultural commonality of the Yoruba 
population,
9
 and the functioning of an important port 
served by transatlantic trade routes made Togo the first 
location for the new cocaine route. The first large-scale 
consignments of cocaine operated jointly by Latino and 
European drug trafficking organizations with the assistance 
of West African networks probably began in Togo around 
the end of the 1990s.  This estimation is based on the extent 
to which the networks had evolved by the year 2000. 
                                                 
8
 Lome (Togo) is just three hours from Lagos, the commercial capital of 
Nigeria, by car (with the normal Lagos car traffic).  
9
 The Yoruba is one of the major ethnic groups of the Gulf of Guinea 
stretching from east Nigeria to Benin and Togo. The Yoruba diaspora is 
also present in the Caribbean and South America (North of Brazil). 
8 
 
According to the records of Operation Decollo (take off) 
conducted by the Italian General Anti-Mafia Prosecutor 
Office,
10
 from 2000 to 2004 the Calabrian Ndrangheta 
families Mancuso and Pesce shipped several hundred kilos 
of cocaine from Colombia via Togo to the container port of 
Gioia Tauro, South of Italy. The first shipment of some 430 
kilos of cocaine from Cartagena (Colombia) via the port of 
Lomé (Togo) arrived in Italy in March 2000; the last of 250 
kilos in January 2004. In this case, the cocaine was 
concealed in containers containing marbles, leather, plastic, 
and tuna cans.      
 
These first shipments on containers proved the efficiency of 
the new route and validated the development of this 
network in terms of location, modus operandi, and 
operational capacity. In particular, the strategic location of 
West Africa as a midway stockpiling and redistribution 
location for the European market—especially emerging 
markets in Eastern Europe—and the Middle East, North 
Africa, and South Africa offered Latino cocaine trafficking 
networks a number of important advantages, all related to 
the reduction of the risks involved with the business. First, 
it reduced risks linked to the seizure of shipments thanks to 
the reduced control on cargo and other commercial 
shipments going and coming from West Africa. Second, it 
operated a fairer redistribution of risk between exporters 
and importers reflected in the sale/purchase prices of 
wholesale cocaine in West Africa. Third, it allowed cocaine 
operators to quickly adjust supply to the demand of the new 
destination markets by narrowing distances and delivery 
time between production and destination markets. 
 
This ambitious marketing strategy called for the setting up 
of stable and efficient logistical stations in West Africa that 
                                                 
10
 ―Commissione Parlamentare d‘ inchiesta sul fenomeno della 
criminalita organizzata mafiosa o  Similar,‖ Relazione annuale sulla 
Ndrangheta, doc. XXIII. No 5, XV Legislatura. Rome, Camera dei 
Deputati, 18 February 2008, page 22.    
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were responsible for stockpiling the product (drugs) and 
developing new routes for its arrival and re-routing to 
Europe. The first incursion by Latinos guided by Nigerian 
networks in Guinea Bissau can be traced back to 2004 
when Latinos opened up a fictitious fishing processing 
plant in the Bijagos islands.
11
 More than likely, this 
development was linked to the business contacts of the 
corrupted entourage of defunct President Lansana Conte in 
Guinea Conakry prior to 2004. Simultaneously, rumors 
about large-scale cocaine trafficking via Mauritania 
involving figures close to PEPs (political exposed persons) 
began in 2005.  By mid-2006, Highway 10 was fully 
operational as proved by the increasing numbers of cocaine 
seizures in Europe facilitated by West African nationals 
and the increasing number of interceptions of large cocaine 
shipments on the high seas by Spanish, French and UK 
Naval Forces.  
                                                 
11
 In December 2006 the judicial police of Guinea Bissau raided the said 
fish factory seizing arms and money. In the same period reliable security 
sources indicated the presence of a well-functioning Latino cocaine 
station in the north of Guinea Bissau close by the border with Senegal.      
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 Source: UNODC, World Drug Report 2010  
 
According to the 2010 Word Drug Report of the UN Office 
on Drugs and Crime, some 25 tons of cocaine worth 
approximately $6.8 billion (retail price) in European 
destination markets were trafficked through West Africa in 
2008.
12
 Despite a slow-down in the volume of shipments in 
2009, due to, in part, external political events which 
destabilized the cocaine trafficking operational structure, 
there are substantive indications that an increase in 
trafficking resumed in 2010 with new operators and 
methods. 
 
FROM SEA TO AIR  
 
The approach adopted by cocaine traffickers in developing 
the new route is a mix of experienced methodologies 
                                                 
12
 UNODC, World Drug Report 2010, (NY, NY:  United Nations), June 
2010, page 242. 
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applied in innovative ways. Originally, the maritime 
smuggling method was the preferred one. As large 
consignments of cocaine were leaving Colombia and 
Venezuela by speedboat and loaded offshore on fishing 
trawlers sailing to West African waters, shipments were 
airdropped at a given location in the Atlantic and collected 
there by fishing trawlers. Once close to the West African 
coast, shipments were then moved inland by speedboat. 
Shipments would generally range from one to four or more 
tons. The flags and ownership of the fishing vessels varied, 
including West African, European, and South American 
naval registrations. Reports from law enforcement 
operators also indicate the purchasing and reconditioning of 
semi wrecked fishing vessels in West Africa by Latino 
operators and their European and African partners for 
single-shipment operations. Overall management of 
maritime operations, reconditioning of fishing trawlers, and 
relations with port and maritime operators were often 
assigned to Spanish nationals (Galician in particular) 
because of their long experience and presence all over the 
Atlantic shores. Crewing was generally made up of Latinos 
and West Africans. 
 
The use of disguised shipping containers played an 
important role in the development and consolidation of the 
West African route as demonstrated by the seizures under 
operation Decollo in Cape Verde,
13
 Senegal, and Nigeria. 
The largest ever cocaine seizure in West Africa took place 
in 2006 when Nigerian authorities seized a container with 
14 tons of cocaine mixed with cement.
14
  The number of 
                                                 
13
 Cape Verde authorities operated two different seizures of cocaine in 
containers bound to Portugal in 2008: the first of 508 Kg in a refrigerated 
container; the second of 171 Kg in a container of scraped metal. See 
―Portuguese, Cape Verdeans sentenced in shipping container drug 
trafficking case,‖ Asemana, 22 October 2008, 
http://www.asemana.publ.cv/spip.php?article36536. 
14
 UNODC, ―Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa – The threat to stability 
and development (with Special reference to Guinea Bissau),‖ December 
12 
 
seizures involving shipping containers in West Africa also 
indicates the capacity of West African drug trafficking 
organizations to diversify sources of supplies and products, 
taking full advantage of globalization. In July 2010, 
Nigerian authorities reported a cocaine seizure (450 
kilograms) in a container originating from Chile.
15
 In 2006 
Senegalese customs seized a container originating in 
Pakistan with 8 tons of hashish, probably originating in 
West Asia and destined for Europe.
16
  The opening of 
trafficking routes for drugs originating from East Asia is 
confirmed by the seizure of a shipment of 130 kilograms of 
heroin in a container originating from Iran at the Tin Can 
Port of Lagos in November 2010.
17
    
 
Starting in 2005, repeated evidence points at the increased 
use of airplanes for both direct shipment of large cocaine 
consignments from South America to West Africa and the 
transferring of smaller cocaine shipments within the West 
African region.  Although undisputed evidence of direct air 
routes from South America to West Africa only became 
available in 2007, information collected in Guinea and 
Guinea Bissau date the opening of the air route back to 
2005; and some evidence suggests the air routes opened 
even prior to 2005. In April 2005, the Judicial Police of 
Guinea Bissau raided a fictitious fish processing facility in 
the Bijagos Islands, seizing 18 kilograms of cocaine and a 
                                                                                                    
2007, page 10, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/west_africa_cocaine_report_2007-12_en.pdf. 
15
 ―Nigerian authorities seize 450 kg of cocaine,‖ The Huffington Post, 27 
July 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20100727/af-
nigeria-cocaine-seizure/. 
16
 Cheikh Tidiane Ndiaye, ―Saisie au port de Dakar de huit tonnes de 
haschich d‘une valeur de 24 milliards de FCFA,‖ APS, 30 March 2006, 
http://www.aps.sn/spip.php?article17519. 
17
 National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), ―NDLEA 
intercepts 130kg heroin worth 99 million destined Europe,‖ Press 
Release, Nigeria, 26 November 2010, 
http://www.ndlea.gov.ng/v1/?q=content/ndlea-intercepts-130kg-heroin-
worth-99-million-destined-europe-us-nigeria-relations-drug-con. 
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large cache of arms. The authorities of Guinea Bissau also 
arrested three Spanish, two Venezuelan, and two 
Colombian nationals. According to information made 
available by Guinea Bissau, the group used a small airplane 
to move cocaine shipments from Guinea Bissau via Cap 
Skirring (Senegal) to Las Palmas (Spain). The operation 
used a small clandestine airport, located near the bogus 
facility, to assist in transporting shipments. One year later, 
after following reports by national and international media 
of clandestine landings and the seizing of a truck loaded 
with aviation fuel in the forest close by the border with 
Guinea, the Army Chief of Staff of Guinea Bissau, General 
Tagme Na Waye, announced the installation of anti-aircraft 
artillery in the Bijagos Islands. According to Tagme at the 
time, ―Any plane detected in this zone without 
authorization will be shot down.‖18   
 
Beginning in 2007, law enforcement authorities from both 
sides of the Atlantic started reporting cocaine seizures 
directed to West Africa involving the use of airplanes. In 
June 2007 2.5 tons of cocaine on a plane destined for Sierra 
Leone was seized by Venezuela.
19
 On 12 July 2008 a Gulf 
Streamer jet coming from Venezuela landed at Bissau 
International Airport.
20
 According to a report by the Judicial 
Police of Guinea Bissau, military personnel surrounded and 
unloaded the plane, which apparently was carrying medical 
                                                 
18
 General Tagme Na Waye was killed in a bomb attack on 2 March 
2009. See Africa Aviation Forums, 
http://www.flyafrica.info/forums/showthread.php?7300-G-Bissau-to-
shoot-drug-planes. 
19
 World Security Network, ―Venezuela, Panama seize cocaine 
shipments,‖ 15 June 2007, 
http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=145
20&topicID=72. 
20
 Morice, “Coke en stock (VI): avion oublié, pilote connu, les deux 
Guinées,‖ 19 October 2010, http://morice.7duquebec.com/?p=68. Also 
see, Tim Gaynor and Tiemoko Diallo, ―Al Qaeda linked to rogue aviation 
network,‖ Reuters, 13 January 2010, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60C3E820100113?pageNumber
=3. 
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preparations. Because of technical problems, the Gulf 
Streamer could not depart and was temporary parked in a 
military hangar. The unexpected landing of the jet plane and 
the active involvement of military personnel in unloading 
and shading the plane attracted the attention of the Judicial 
Police of Guinea Bissau, which requested an investigation. 
In the following days, the police arrested three policemen 
and two air traffic-control agents, as well as the Latino crew 
of the plane. Among the crew was Mr. Carmelo Vasquez 
Guerra, a Mexican who was investigated by Mexican Police 
for piloting a DC-9 jet loaded with 5 tons of cocaine in 2006. 
On 17 July an inspection team flown into Guinea Bissau by 
INTERPOL was permitted to search the plane. The 
inspection team did not find any cocaine onboard; however, 
drug-sniffing dogs did find cocaine on the plane, and the 
black box also confirmed suspicions about the actual mission 
of the plane. The same Gulf Streamer plane, purchased in the 
US a few months before, was under watch by the DEA 
because of its likely use in drug trafficking operations. 
Although evidence was mounting, all arrested Latinos had 
fled the country due to the ―good services‖ provided by a 
very influential legal attorney.  
 
The use of jet airplanes for transatlantic operations reached 
its peak in November 2009, when the wreckage of a burned 
Boeing 727 was discovered in the middle of the Sahel desert 
in the Gao region of Mali. According to investigators, the 
Boeing was registered in Guinea Bissau and belonged to a 
company called Africa Air.  It took off from Panama on 16 
October en route to Mali. After a refueling stop in 
Maracaibo, Venezuela, the airplane disappeared from the 
radar screens of Venezuelan authorities, reappearing close to 
the border with Colombia. A few hours later the Venezuelan 
air control authorities located the plane over the Isla 
Margaritas, flying toward Africa. Despite the alert by 
Venezuelan authorities to all West African and international 
counterparts, no information about the plane was available 
until 16 November when the Office for West Africa of the 
United Nations Office for Drug and Crime (UNODC) 
15 
 
announced the discovery of the wreckages of the Boeing 727 
some 200 km north of Gao, Mali. According to investigators, 
the plane landed on an improvised sand landing strip.  After 
the cocaine shipment, ranging from 2.5 to 9 tons, was loaded 
onto a convoy of 4WD vehicles, the plane was torched.
21
 
The case of the Boeing 727 does not appear to be unique. 
According to local sources,
22
 several large cocaine air 
shipments had already used the Sahel-Saharan landing 
facilities, taking advantage of well-established trans-Saharan 
smuggling routes and the presence of rebels and terrorist 
groups operating all through the Sahel-Saharan belt 
(Mauritania, the Northern regions of Mali, Niger, and Chad). 
23
  
 
Smaller airplanes were used in the region for breaking down, 
redistributing, and re-routing large cocaine shipments into 
smaller consignments (up to 900 kilograms). In May 2007 
Mauritanian authorities seized 629 kg of cocaine abandoned 
on the tarmac of the Nouadhibou Airport by a small Cessna 
441 turbo propeller airplane that originated out of Venezuela 
and was later recovered in the desert some 125 km from the 
airport.
24
 Subsequent investigations led to the seizure of an 
additional 860 kg of cocaine in Nouakchott,
25
 and resulted in 
the seizure of one additional airplane, one helicopter, and the 
                                                 
21
 Serge Daniel, “Burnout Boeing, a clue in African drugs trade,‖ AFP, 
11 December 2009, 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i6w-
doyjewoRGhOaaAHVYfrVWONQ. 
22
 Salima Tlemçani, ―Au Sahel, narcotrafiquants et terroristes se 
partagent le terrain”, El Watan, 1 November 2010, 
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/au-sahel-narcotrafiquants-et-
terroristes-se-partagent-le-terrain-01-11-2010-97159_109.php. 
23
  Morice, ―Coke en stock (IV) Boeing, Touaregs… et espions !,‖ 16 
October 2010, http://morice.7duquebec.com/?p=55. 
24
  INTERPOL, ―INTERPOL issues Red Notice for suspected drug 
trafficker,‖ 20 June 2007, 
http://www.interpol.int/public/icpo/pressreleases/pr2007/pr200724.asp. 
25
 Ibrahima Sylla, ―Mauritania seizes 860kg cocaine in biggest seizure,‖ 
Reuters, 14 August 2007, 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2007/08/14/idINIndia-28978520070814. 
16 
 
indictment of twelve people including two French nationals, 
two Belgians, one Moroccan, and seven Mauritanians. 
Among the indicted Mauritanians was Sidi Mohamed Ould 
Haidalla, son of former Mauritanian President Mohamed 
Khouna Ould Haidalla.
26
 Reliable local sources involved in 
the investigation of the case indicated that the cocaine most 
likely had previously arrived by sea, had been stocked in a 
villa rented by the Mauritanian trafficking group just nearby 
the Nouadihbou landing strip, and had been ready on the 
tarmac for loading onto the small Cessna plane for inward 
dispatching to either Morocco or some location on the Sahel-
Saharan belt. Another example of the use of small planes in 
trafficking occurred in June 2007.  A small hydroplane had 
taken off somewhere in the Sahara desert, close to 
Mauritania and the Western Sahara. Subsequently, the 
emergency landing of this small hydroplane on a private 
airport in the southern part of Gran Canary Island led to a 
preliminary seizure of a bag with 25 kg of cocaine.
27
 An 
additional 800 kg of cocaine were then recovered by the 
Spanish Navy in the territorial waters of the Canary Islands, 
following the information given by the arrested Uruguayan 
pilot.  
 
The most representative case of the use of small turbo 
propeller airplanes for regional transhipment of cocaine 
occurred in Sierra Leone on 13 July 2008. On this occasion, 
Sierra Leone authorities seized over 600 kg of cocaine in a 
twin turbo propeller airplane abandoned on the tarmac of the 
                                                 
26
 Morice, “Coke en stock (VII): en Mauritanie, même avion, même 
procédé,‖  22 October 2010,  
http://www.centpapiers.com/coke-en-stock-vii-en-mauritanie-meme-
avion-meme-procede/42672. 
27
 Erena Calvo, ―Hallan 800 kilos de cocaína tras el amerizaje forzoso de 
un hidroavión,‖ ABC España,  21 June 2007,  
http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-21-06-
2007/abc/Nacional/hallan-800-kilos-de-cocaina-tras-el-amerizaje-
forzoso-de-un-hidroavion_1633827367526.html. 
17 
 
Freetown Lungi International Airport.
28
  After an 
unauthorized landing, the crew of the plane abandoned the 
plane, cocaine, AK 47 and AK 48 rifles, and ammunition. 
The airplane bore false Red Cross logos
29
 on the tail and was 
equipped with additional tanks for extended flying range. 
Sierra Leone Police eventually arrested eleven foreign 
nationals including a Colombian, six Venezuelans, one US 
national, a Nigerian, a national from Guinea Bissau, and a 
number of Sierra Leoneans, including police officers and one 
airport control officer.  Among the arrested Sierra Leoneans 
was the brother of the Minister of Transport, who tendered 
his resignation a few days later. According to Michael 
Schulenburg, Head of the United Nations Mission in Sierra 
Leone, ―there must be many more flights like this.‖30 In 
previous years, informants from both Guinea Bissau and 
Guinea Conakry had reported the landing and taking off of 
small planes bearing UN and Red Cross logos. Incidentally, 
the seizure in Sierra Leone occurred just one day after the 
landing in Bissau of the Gulf Streamer jet from Venezuela.
31
  
 
More mysterious is how West African cocaine shipments 
reach European markets. Seizures in Europe prove only the 
continued use of human couriers, which cannot be 
accountable for the more than the 25-30 tons of narcotics 
                                                 
28
 ―Sierra Leone police seize drugs plane,‖ BBC World News, 14 July 
2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7504953.stm.     
29
 The use of fake Red Cross and UN logos on small drug trafficking 
airplanes seems to be quite common. On 10 August 2010 Panamanian 
authorities seized a small Cessna 206 plane with UNICEF and Red Cross 
logos in the province of Santa Ana, Los Santos. According to the 
investigation, the plane was used for moving drug (heroin, cocaine, and 
methamphetamine) shipments. See  Zenaida Valdés, ―Avioneta 
trasportaba drogas: hay tres detenidos,” Critica en Línea, 25 August 
2010,   
http://www.critica.com.pa/archivo/08252010/suc17.html#axzz19cSeM8q
K. 
30
 ―Cocaine bust: 3 more arrested,‖ AFP, 17 July 2008, 
http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Cocaine-bust-3-more-arrested-
20080717. 
31
 See page 10. 
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that the UNODC estimated as likely transiting annually via 
West Africa.
32
 If part of the cocaine stocked in West Africa 
is re-exported via the maritime channel (via fishing vessels 
and containers, as proved by the seizures of containers in 
Cape Verde in 2008),
33
 analysts nowadays are inclined to 
assign a more prominent role to the rerouting of large 
shipments (up to 7 tons) via the Sahel-Saharan corridor. 
Unloaded from planes as large as the Malian 727-200 or as 
small as the Mauritanian Cessna, shipments are loaded onto 
convoys of 4WD vehicles which, with the help of Tourag 
guides and the logistical assistance of terrorist and guerrilla 
groups operating in the region, cross the Sahel-Saharan belt 
both from South to North (towards the Mediterranean shores 
of Algeria, Morocco, and Libya), and from West to East (via 
the trans-Saharan routes crossing the northern parts of Mali, 
Niger, Chad, Sudan, and Egypt). Once at Northern Africa 
Mediterranean shores, cocaine shipments are transferred to 
European destinations via speedboats equipped with up to 
2000 HP engines and supplementary tanks able to reach 
Spain and Italian shores,
34
 or are re-embarked on maritime 
cargo ships heading toward European ports. According to 
analysts, likely destinations for North African re-embarked 
cocaine shipments could be the ports of Balkan and south 
Eastern European countries.
35
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 UNODC World Drug Report 2010, (NY, NY:  United Nations), June 
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 See footnote 18 above. 
34
 ―Tracking down drug smugglers in the Mediterranean,‖ France 24, 13 
December 2008, http://www.france24.com/en/20081212-tracking-down-
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FOREIGNERS BUT INCREASINGLY MORE AFRICANS      
 
As mentioned above, Nigerian criminal entrepreneurs were 
the first to open up West Africa to the drug trafficking 
business. Since then, drug trafficking operators in the 
region have grown considerably, both in term of origin 
(West African, South American, and European) and 
capacities (facilitators, transporters, partners, and 
producers). Based on arrests and investigations carried out 
in Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Togo, Ghana, and Senegal, Latin 
American cocaine trafficking organizations, particularly 
Colombian organizations, have established stable bases in 
the region, controlling and developing the route. West 
African facilitators, Nigerian but also and increasingly 
nationals from all countries where shipments are stocked, 
have developed a stronger capacity for taking over a more 
ambitious and lucrative role in the business as transporters, 
partners, and final buyers. In one case (Guinea), the West 
African partner had already started developing his own 
trafficking and manufacturing capacity, reproducing the 
patterns that made Colombia the business model of the 
drug industry. In this reshaped context, of particular 
concern is the role played by the Colombian FARC 
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) as 
provider of cocaine shipments to West African cocaine 
entrepreneurs, as well as the impact of drug trafficking 
money on the financing of terrorist and rebel groups 
operating in the Sahel-Saharan belt.  
 
FROM FACILITATORS TO PRODUCERS 
 
On 7 July 2007, The Economist published a short article on 
Guinea Bissau titled, ―Pushers‘ Paradise—the Drugs Trade 
in the Continent‘s First Narco-state is Booming.‖36 The 
article, the first by a leading international magazine, 
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 ―Pushers' paradise: The drugs trade in the continent's first narco-state is 
booming,‖ 7 June 2007, The Economist, 
http://www.economist.com/node/9304402. 
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analyzed the implications of cocaine trafficking on fragile 
state like Guinea Bissau. Almost two years later, Marco 
Vernaschi was awarded first prize in the Photographers 
Giving Back Photo Award for a photo showing the blood-
stained steel chair on which the President of Guinea-Bissau, 
João Bernardo Viera, was executed.
37
 From Bissau, Mr. 
Vernaschi also published a series of articles, one of which 
was titled, ―Guinea Bissau: A Gangster's Paradise,‖38 where 
he describes his direct experience with Augusto Bliri, a 
―young but talented drug lord who is legend in Bissau.‖ The 
story of Bliri is probably not different from the many other 
foot soldiers of the drug industry in Mexico, Colombia, or 
Albania, and represents the danger to which countries like 
Guinea Bissau are exposed. Augusto started his career as 
drug trafficker by buying back recovered cocaine bricks 
from Guinea Bissau fishermen and reselling them to Latinos 
and international traffickers. The money generated from this 
allowed Augusto to move ahead in the trafficking chain and 
become a visible reference for young Guinea Bissau 
traffickers. The article describes, in simple but frank terms, 
the likely trajectory of West African cocaine traffickers from 
―pushers‖ to ―gangsters.‖ The history of Augusto Bliri, the 
Guinea Bissau pusher-turned-cocaine-kingpin, describes 
only the most obvious part of the story and does not identify 
the real operators and masterminds of the West African 
cocaine trade. Much more representative are the stories of 
Sidi Mohamed Ould Haidalla,
39
 son of former of 
Mauritanian President Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla, and 
Ousmane Conte, the eldest son of the President of Guinea 
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Lansana Conte,
40
 and Rear Admiral Jose Americo Bubo Na 
Tchuto, openly accused by the US as being a major drug 
kingpin.
41
 Each of them could be considered a different but 
complementary model of the new West African drug 
trafficking industry in the realms of transportation, 
partnerships, entrepreneurship, and facilitation. Their stories 
mirror (to a certain extent) the success stories of Mexican 
and Colombian drug entrepreneurs who were able to create 
viable narco-trafficking industries from controlling and 
developing a trafficking route. 
 
Probably the most interesting profile among the individuals 
mentioned above is that of Ousmane Conte, arrested together 
with his brother Aususmane and his brother-in-law Saturnin 
Bangoura shortly after the coup that followed the death of 
President Lansana Conte of Guinea on December 2008. 
Released on bail in July 2010, Ousmane Conte confessed on 
Guinean TV his involvement in drug trafficking. Beside 
cocaine trafficking, Ousmane Conte was suspected of being 
involved in the smuggling of migrants, as well as carrying 
out indiscriminate violence resulting in the deaths of some 
129 civilians during riots that occurred in Conakry at the 
beginning of 2007 (while he was Captain of the Red Berets 
                                                 
40
 Ousamene Conte was arrested by the Guinea military junta 
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(Presidential Guard)).
42
 In addition to multiple criminal 
activities, Ousamane Conte is strongly linked to the 
attempted upgrading of Guinea Conakry from the simple role 
of a stockpiling and redistribution location to one of a 
producer of cocaine and methamphetamine.  
 
On 15 July 2009, the authorities of Guinea raided a 
suspected drug processing facility, seizing equipment and 
toxic chemical substances. Reports about drug processing 
facilities in Guinea had been circulating among the 
intelligence community since 2007, as well as rumors about 
the attempt of introducing opium poppy cultivation in the 
highlands of Guinea. A later UNODC- INTERPOL mission 
visited the eight seized facilities located in Conakry and in 
the nearby native village of former President Lousana Conte, 
some 100 kilometers north of Conakry. The UNODC -
INTERPOL mission confirmed that the equipment and the 
chemical substances seized
43
 enabled the processing of 
cocaine and heroin and the production of methamphetamine 
and MDMA (ecstasy).
44
  
 
Ousmane Conte and Sidi Mohamed Ould Haidalla shared 
one common feature: their closeness to power, which gave 
drug traffickers and any other criminal elements the benefit 
of a considerable reduction of the risks
45
 connected with the 
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 Human Rights Watch, ―Guinea: Free Rein to Security Forces Fuels 
Violence -Government Should Create Independent Body to Investigate, 
Prosecute Abuses,‖ 24 April 2007, 
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drug business. Moreover, the benefits and corruptive power 
of criminal activity do not know gender boundaries, as 
proved by the case of Ms. Zainab Conte, a wife of former 
President of Guinea Lousana Conte. She was arrested whilst 
attempting to cross the Sierra Leone border with hundreds of 
thousands US dollars and Euros and some gold bars. 
According to a leaked cable from the US Embassy in 
Freetown: 
 
A presidential advisor reported that, though 
border officials detained Zainab and a convoy 
of three luxury vehicles, they waved other 
vehicles through, not realizing one contained 
the long-sought after Gibrilla Kamara (aka 
GK). Kamara is a prime suspect in the July 
13 cocaine bust, and the only “big fish” 
remaining outside the net of the Sierra Leone 
Police. Thought to be one of the drug 
trafficking ring’s key facilitators, rumours 
abounded that he had fled to Guinea shortly 
after the bust. It now appears that Kamara 
remained in Sierra Leone with the currency 
and other valuables, with the intention of 
crossing the border under the protection of 
Zainab.
46
 
 
Ms. Conte and her convoy of three luxury 4WD vehicles 
were later released following a telephone call from President 
Conte of Guinea to President Koroma of Sierra Leone. 
According to other sources, the intent of Ms. Conte‘s travel 
to Sierra Leone was buying back the cocaine seized one 
month before at Lungi International Airport. Mastermind and 
financial promoter of the operation was Ousamane Conte, 
probably the owner of the seized shipment.   
                                                 
46
 Festus Lahai, ―Ernest Koroma Aides Escape of Drug Lord,‖ The New 
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The need for reducing risk by enlisting into the business 
young but influential West African personalities is further 
proved by the DEA‘s ―Operation Relentless,‖47 which 
contributed to the dismantling of an international network 
led by a Colombian trafficker and involving Nigerians and a 
Russian pilot (July 2010). In this case the defendants were 
accused (and eventually convicted) of trying to smuggle 
several tons of cocaine from Colombia and Venezuela to 
West Africa, and subsequently to the US. According to wire-
taped conversations, the network had access to a private 
airfield in Guinea, and was considering buying its own 
airport in order to arrange direct deliveries from Bolivia to 
West Africa. The group also planned to set up 
methamphetamine production in Liberia. In order to operate, 
the network tried to enlist the Director and Deputy Director 
of the Liberian Security Agency, both of who were working 
as undercover agents for the DEA. Incidentally, the Director 
of the National Security Agency of Liberia, Mr. Fombah Teh 
Sirleaf, is also the son of the President of Liberia
48
.    
 
FOREIGN PROVIDERS, REBELS AND TERRORIST 
GROUPS  
 
The development and growth of West African trafficking 
routes could have not happened without the participation and 
the in loco presence of European, South American (mostly 
Colombian), and North African traffickers. As mentioned 
above, the Italian Ndrangheta set up operations via Togo in 
2004: the Pesce and Mancuso clans are said to be present in 
Togo from where they supposedly traffick cocaine to 
                                                 
47
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Attorney announces unsealing of charges arising from historic 
undercover operation in the Republic of Liberia,‖ 1 July 2010, 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/June10/operationrelentless
liberiapr.pdf. 
48
 Chris Hawley, ―New Trend in Drug Smuggling: Secret Trans-Atlantic 
Flights in Old Jets,‖ Associated Press, 15 November 2010, 
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/new-trend-drug-smuggling-secret-
trans-at. 
25 
 
Europe.
49
  The Ndrangheta operational presence in West 
Africa was confirmed in 2007 when the Italian Guardia di 
Finanza seized 250 kg of Bolivian cocaine in Milan 
belonging to the Ndrangheta clan Morabito-Bruzzaniti-
Palamara.
50
 The shipment was hidden in a camper originally 
from Brazil but re-shipped to Italy from Dakar. Sicilian 
mafias also showed their presence in West Africa. In 2005 
the Italian security services picked up the Sicilian mafia boss 
Giovanni Bonomo on the tarmac of the Dakar international 
airport.
51
 Coming from Abidjan, Mr. Bonomo was regularly 
visiting Dakar where he apparently had a stake in gambling 
and tourism businesses. In Italy, Mr. Bonomo was the boss 
of the Partinico ―mandamento,‖ a village in the outskirts of 
Palermo. 
 
The networks established by the Italian Mafiosi preceded the 
arrival and installation of Latinos, principally Colombian and 
Venezuelan, in the region. Controllers of the supply from the 
other side of the Atlantic, Colombians and their Venezuelan 
partners, are nowadays the most prominent operators in the 
region. According to the DEA, at least nine top-tier South 
American and Mexican drug trafficking organizations 
(DTOs) have established operations in Africa since 2007.
52
 
The ideological differences that, in the past, could be drawn 
between representatives of Colombian DTOs and Colombian 
guerrilla organizations (particularly the FARC) seem 
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nowadays blurred when looking at the development of the 
Colombian presence in West Africa. Based on arrests and 
intelligence reports, both are well established in the region. 
In November 2008, the Togolese police, with the assistance 
of the DEA, dismantled in Lomé, Togo, an international 
cocaine trafficking network made up of nationals from 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, South Africa, Ghana, and 
Togo.
53
 According to a report, the group was planning to fly 
cocaine from South America to a landing strip in the 
northern part of the country. Once in Togo, cocaine 
shipments would be moved to the port of Lomé and rerouted 
to European destinations via containers. Some members of 
the group had entered the country a few months before with 
diplomatic passports issued in Guinea. One of the arrested 
persons was Jorge Solano Cortes, a well-known partner of 
the Rodriguez brothers in the Cali Cartel, who had started his 
cocaine trafficking career as a deputy of Harold Ackerman in 
the early 1990s.
54
  
 
Beginning in 2006, intelligence reports alerted the 
international community of the interest of the FARC in 
developing the West African route. In August 2007 Guinea-
Bissau's police announced the arrest of two Colombians after 
seizing weapons and a large sum of money in a raid on a 
suspected location in the Bairro Militar of Bissau.
55
 During 
the raid police also seized documents relating the two 
Colombians to the highest levels of Guinea Bissau‘s 
institutional and political powers. One of the two arrested 
was identified as Juan Pablo Rubio Camacho, already 
convicted in the US for cocaine trafficking in 1988. In 2001 
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Colombian police arrested Juan Pablo Camacho and accused 
him as being one of the organizers of the money laundering 
machinery of the FARC. According to reports made 
available at the moment of the arrest, Juan Pablo Camacho 
owned properties worth some $50 million in Panama.
56
 The 
FARC also appears as a direct promoter of the West African 
route by providing regular cocaine shipments to West Africa. 
In the indictment submitted by the Manhattan US Attorney 
against Marcel Acevedo Sarmiento in the case following the 
DEA‘s ―Relentless Operation,‖57 Ms. Daria Lupacchino, 
DEA Special Agent involved in the case, related that two of 
the defendants not only confirmed FARC ownership of 
cocaine to be shipped to Liberia but also the FARC‘s 
readiness to send regular cocaine supplies to West Africa. 
 
A further serious concern of the West African drug 
trafficking scenario is represented by the growing relevance 
of cocaine money in the financing of rebel and terrorist 
groups operating in the Sahel-Saharan corridors.
58
 Collected 
evidence (seizures and arrests) allows for the connection of 
direct links between rebel and terrorist groups operating in 
the region to cocaine trafficking. With the exception of a 
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recent case presented by the DEA at the US Southern 
District Court of New York,
59
 these links are more the result 
of situational awareness on the ground and reports from the 
media
60
 rather than data from investigations and 
prosecutions. Indeed, providing logistical assistance to 
trafficking operations and charging security fees for ensuring 
free and safe passage of illicit shipments is certainly an easy 
source of fresh cash for those involved in the trade and for 
those traffickers who are able to operate in uncontrolled 
territories.
61
 
 
Running from the shores of the Atlantic to the Mediterranean 
Sea, the Sahel-Saharan route has always served as main 
trading and communication route for the nomadic migrations 
of Tuareg communities living in Mauritania, Northern Mali, 
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Niger, and Chad. The almost total absence of a state 
presence and state control over this huge territory and the 
independent nature of Tuareg communities, in tandem with 
an increased presence of bandits and rebel and terrorist 
groups, have resulted in an ideal environment for the 
development of a smuggling-based economy. Besides 
contraband of licit items and the smuggling of small arms, 
the Sahel-Saharan corridor became one of the preferred 
routes for cigarette smuggling in the early 1990‘s. Known in 
Algeria as the ―Marlboro Connection,‖ cigarette smuggling 
prospered due to the complacent attitude of local border 
authorities. By early 2000, the same route started to be used 
for trafficking of arms, migrants, and hashish. From April 
2006 to April 2007, Niger authorities reported the seizure of 
5.7 tons of hashish in five different operations carried out in 
the Northern part of the country.
62
 In the same period, the 
Mouvement des Nigeriens pour la Justice (MNJ), a Tuareg 
rebel group operating mostly in the Northern part of Niger, 
also announced the seizure of a large consignment of 
narcotics,
63
 probably hashish, which was first offered to 
authorities in the region for destruction and later sold to 
North African buyers. Also, in December 2007 the 
international media reported the seizure of 750 kg of cocaine 
by Malian customs following a shootout with a caravan of 
highly armed traffickers 150 km north of Kidal.
64
 Two 
months later, Malian authorities officially announced that the 
drug seized was hashish and not cocaine. Incidentally, Mr. 
Sidi Mohammed Ould Haidallah, the mastermind of the 
Mauritanian cocaine trafficking network,
65
 was arrested in 
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Morocco in 2008 where he was residing with a Malian 
passport released in Gao, a key location on the Sahel-
Saharan route. Final confirmation of the importance and 
upgrading of the route for cocaine trafficking is given by the 
story of the Boeing 727 landed in Mali in 2009.  
 
The destructive and corruptive effects of drug trafficking 
money in the Sahel-Saharan region on genuine political 
claims and struggles is further evidenced by the recent arrest 
in Mali on drug trafficking charges of six alleged members 
of the Front Polisario,
66
 a separatist movement fighting for 
decades to get independence for the Western Sahara. One of 
the arrested, Sultan Ould Bady, seems also to be involved in 
the kidnapping and subsequent sales of European hostages in 
the Sahara before joining the ranks of AQIM (al-Qaeda in 
the Maghreb). In August 2010, Mauritanian authorities 
―deported‖ to Mali a well-known Sahwari, Omar Ahmed 
Ould Sidi Ould Hama (aka Omar Sahraoui), sentenced to life 
imprisonment in Mauritania for masterminding the AQIM 
kidnapping of three Spanish aid workers in 2009. According 
to reports, the ―deportation‖ of Omar Sahraoui was part of a 
deal allowing the release of two Spanish nationals kidnapped 
by AQIM.
67
 Front Polisario had openly denounced the risk 
of infiltration of AQIM in its ranks and in the very 
impoverished Sahrawi‘s camps located at the border of 
Western Sahara. 
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 ―Drug traffickers arrested in Mali,‖ 10 December 2010, 
http://m.news24.com/news24/Africa/News/Drug-traffickers-arrested-in-
Mali-20101210. 
67
 According to media reports, Malian authorities did not request for 
Sahraoui‘s deportation to Mauritanian authorities and never 
acknowledged his arrival in Mali. The same sources state that Sahraouian 
―disappeared‖ after he was handed over to Mali. See ―Spanish hostages 
release: Al-Qaeda active in Polisario-controlled area,‖ Middle East 
Online, 26 August 2010, http://www.middle-east-
online.com/english/?id=40899. 
31 
 
WEST AFRICAN STYLE   
 
The above-described situation, despite a more convoluted 
scenario in terms of actors, operational capacities, and modus 
operandi, calls for a tentative comparative analysis with 
similar situations experienced by other regions and countries. 
Building upon proved successes and failures might assist 
West Africa in mitigating the worst effects of the lure of a 
booming drug trafficking industry. The emerging West 
African drug industry, however, contains some nuances, and 
cannot be entirely analyzed based on Colombian and 
Mexican drug trafficking experiences. Indeed, Colombia and 
Mexico have built their drug industries on pre-existent 
cultivation and subsequent exporting/smuggling networks. In 
the case of Colombia, the cocaine boom was built on the 
marijuana industry and the so-called “marimberos‖ of the 
Caribbean coast.
68
 In the case of Mexico, cocaine trafficking 
took advantage of the already existent networks developed 
by Mexican drug trafficking organizations that specialized in 
marijuana and heroin (black tar) production by generations 
of ―gomeros‖ localized in the Sonora state.69 The proximity 
to the largest consumer market for illicit drugs, however, 
clearly added value and opportunities to the Mexican drug 
trafficking industry. Differences also exist in terms of the 
main actors involved. Whilst in West Africa, main drug 
trafficking actors appeared to be linked to elites; in Mexico 
and Colombia, prominent figures in drug trafficking come 
from popular origins and had to build up their careers on 
their specific (criminal) competences rather than pre-existent 
wealth and ability in corrupting and infiltrating state 
institutions. In other words, as in Colombia and Mexico, 
drug trafficking mirrored the overall social and economic 
transition of national societies towards liberal markets and 
                                                 
68
 Darío Betancurt and Martha L. García, Contrabandistas, marimberos y 
mafiosos- Historia Social de la mafia Colombiana (1965 – 1992), 
(Bogotá, Colombia: TM editores, 1994).   
69
 Luis Astorga, El siglo de las drogas: el narcotráfico del Porfiriato al 
nuevo milenio, (México, MX: Plaza y Janes Editoriales, 2005). 
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democratic rule. In West Africa drug trafficking has mostly 
benefited, directly or indirectly, the same elites who 
monopolize economic opportunities arising from the 
participation of West African economies in global markets.
70
  
 
As to the participation and increased role of terrorist and 
guerrilla groups, the Colombian and West African situations 
also vary. In Colombia, FARC and paramilitary groups 
benefited from control of production. Hence, their direct 
involvement in trafficking came at a second stage and as a 
natural consequence of control over raw materials and their 
related markets. In the Sahel-Saharan corridors terrorist and 
rebel groups capitalize on their logistical and territorial 
control capacities, offering drug traffickers services in 
exchange for money (and perhaps arms). The West African 
situation also radically diverges from the one characterized 
by the presence of structured Mafia-type criminal 
organizations, the aim of which is ―controlling the supply of 
protection‖71 to any actor operating in their territories, often 
in competition with state institutions. From this perspective, 
the very nature of West African drug trafficking syndicates, 
modeled on the loose business-oriented Nigerian model, 
represents per se a new challenging and successful model of 
an organized criminal network. Hence, there is no value in 
comparing the West African drug trafficking situation to the 
ones prevalent in scenarios characterized by the operation of 
the Italian and Russian mafias, the Japanese yakuza, or the 
Chinese triads. 
 
The scenarios which can be compared with the West African 
one are those offered by some Central American countries 
                                                 
70
 J. F. Bayart, S. Ellis, B. Hibou,  La Criminalisation de l’État en 
Afrique,  (Brussels, Belgium: Complexe, 1997).  
71
 Federico Varese (Ed.), Organized Crime - Critical Concepts in 
Criminology, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010). According 
to the definitions by Prof. Varese, ―an organized crime group attempts to 
control the production, supply and distribution of a given commodity or 
service unlawfully … A Mafia group is type of organized criminal group 
which attempts to control the supply of protection.‖ 
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(Guatemala and Honduras) and the Caribbean (Jamaica, in 
particular). As in West Africa, in Honduras and Guatemala 
foreign drug trafficking organizations (Colombian and 
Mexican) seem to have established an operational basis for 
stockpiling large cocaine shipments destined for North 
American markets, infiltrated state institutions, and have 
developed business alliances with members of economic and 
political establishments. In December 2010, President 
Alvaro Colón of Guatemala declared a state of emergency in 
a province bordering Mexico because of the presence and 
operation of the (Mexican) Zetas drug trafficking 
organization.
72
 In Honduras, the Chief of the Anti-Narcotics 
Squad was murdered just after he publicly denounced the 
complicity of land-owners in the landing and subsequent 
unloading of cocaine in airplanes in December 2009.
73
 
Different from West Africa, Honduras and Guatemala also 
present a complex internal criminal panorama featuring the 
presence and territorial challenge to state institutions by 
maras, juvenile criminal gangs operating in Mexico and the 
US. The scenario and experience of Jamaica in the cocaine 
flows of the 1980‘s provides an example of what West 
Africa may experience as a consequence of the growth of 
small cocaine trafficking gangs like the one led by Augusto 
Bliri in Guinea Bissau. The recent case of the extradition 
from Jamaica to the US of drug kingpin Christopher 
―Dudus‖ Coke provides a clear example of the costs of 
letting native drug traffickers prosper.
74
  Common and 
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certainly threatening features of both the Central American 
and the Caribbean scenarios are the very high murder rates, 
among the highest in the world,
75
 and the linkages to the 
effects of drug (cocaine) trafficking. Violence in these two 
scenarios mirrors two complementary phases of the 
destabilizing effects of drug trafficking. In Central America, 
violence is mostly instrumental to affirming control of 
trafficking routes. In the Caribbean (particularly in Jamaica), 
violence is the result of turf wars among criminal groups 
caused by the drying up of drug-derived revenues. Luckily, 
drug trafficking-originated violence is still minimal in West 
Africa, but previous well documented experiences of civil 
conflicts caused by the fight over control for important 
sources of revenues (oil, diamonds, etc.) ought to serve as a 
clear indicator of the risks. 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
    
Far from losing its relevance, the West African routes and 
the increasingly complex network of operators involved are a 
serious threat to the stability and balanced development of 
the region. Stronger in terms of operational capacity and 
global networking, West African operators, whether criminal 
entrepreneurs from the Atlantic coast or members of terrorist 
and rebel groups operating in the Sahel-Saharan corridor, are 
gradually climbing the ladders of the drug and criminal 
industries. Their rise will extract a heavy price on West 
African societies and institutions, slowing down, if not 
hijacking, the pace of social and economic development. 
Countries and institutions unable to evade and/or counter the 
corruptive power and lure of the culture of drug money will 
                                                                                                    
army operatives and gangs. ―Profile: Christopher ‗Dudus‘ Coke,‖ BBC 
News, 23 June 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10146172. 
75
 UNODC, ―The destabilizing influence of drug trafficking on transit 
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245. Also see ―Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and 
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World Bank), March 2007. 
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pay the heaviest price. Conscious of the risks, governments 
in the region, their partners, and the international community 
have devised plans and operational mechanisms
76
 which, if 
properly and promptly implemented, ought to provide 
effective responses to this threatening menace. Yet, as 
cautioned by former Minister of Justice of Guinea Bissau, 
Ms. Carmelita Pires, the current Special Advisor to the 
President of the ECOWAS Commission, political will and 
robust partnership between the sub-region and the 
international community will be crucial in order to end ―the 
culture of impunity.‖77 Indeed, focusing on drug trafficking 
should not divert attention from the core problems of the 
West African situation: corruption, impunity, and the 
progressive erosion of a culture of respect for legality and 
state institutions.  
 
West Africa could, in this respect, learn from the experiences 
of Guatemala (and it‘s International Commission Against 
Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG)). Restoring confidence in 
justice and in national institutions—breaking the circle of 
impunity, particularly when impunity is a peculiar feature of 
political and economic power—is indispensable to the inputs 
of technical cooperation the international community may be 
ready to provide. Undoubtedly, any West African-CICIG 
experience should maximize the strengthening of the 
capacity of national institutions, be less ―intrusive‖ as 
possible, and focus on the capacity-building of reliable teams 
of investigators, prosecutors, and judges accountable to the 
highest authorities of the state and civic society. In this 
respect, external independent commissions should then 
                                                 
76 Among them, certainly the 2008 ECOWAS political declaration and regional 
action plan to combat drug trafficking and organized crime in West Africa, and 
the joint UNODC-UNDPA-UNDPKO and INTERPOL West Coast Initiative. 
Also national integrated programs against drug and crime have been developed 
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enforcement and justice in the West African Region (including Nigeria) for some 
USD 70 million.  
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periodically verify progress in the fight against impunity and 
publicly report about them to both national stakeholders 
(including civic society) and the international community. 
Also, international partners of West African countries ought 
to take a clear stand against those PEPs suspected of 
involvement in criminal affairs. The examples given by the 
US with respect to the cases of Guinea and Guinea Bissau set 
a clear standard and silence those voices which are ready to 
offer impunity to native drug and war lords in exchange for 
an uncertain renunciation of the use of violence in post-
conflict scenarios. Investing in justice, legality, and good 
governance may sound like a long term utopian investment,
78
 
but it is the only way to nurture a culture of the rule of law 
and of state which can eventually minimize the impact of 
drug and other criminal organizations.          
                                                 
78  Carlo Maria Verardi, ―Democrazia, giustizia e libertà,‖ Speech delivered at the 
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